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Abstract 
Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy of September 15, 2008, a number of foreign 
governments enacted stabilization measures in order to bolster their currencies and inject 
much-needed liquidity into domestic markets. As part of its effort, the Korean Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance announced a series of government interventions that included a three-
year guarantee of foreign debt issued (including extensions of maturity) by domestic banks 
between October 20, 2008, and June 30, 2009. This opt-in program was introduced as a 
preemptive step in ensuring that Korean financial institutions would retain competitive 
access to external funding in the wake of the global credit crunch. Though the guarantee cap 
was set at $100 billion, maximum utilization totaled only $1.3 billion issued by a single 
participant (Hana Bank). On June 30, 2012, the guarantee scheme was terminated with the 
repayment of all obligations by Hana Bank.  
Keywords: Korea, foreign debt, government guarantee
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee 
programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 





At a Glance  
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September of 2008 prompted many 
governments of developed economies to 
coordinate stabilization efforts in order to 
calm domestic and global markets. Among 
those, the Republic of Korea enacted on 
October 20, 2008, a series of measures that 
its Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
recommended would both aid in boosting 
the won against the dollar and help to 
relieve liquidity pressures stemming from 
the foreign currency loans coming to 
maturity in the midst of the worldwide 
credit crunch. This package included a 
$100 billion, three-year government 
guarantee of foreign debt issued (including 
extensions of maturity) by domestic banks 
between October 20, 2008, and June 30, 
2009. The opt-in program would allow 
participants access to guarantee coverage 
for up to 100% of principal and interest, 
including default interest and related 
expenses.  
Eligible domestic banks needed to apply to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance to obtain 
foreign debt guarantees. Individual guarantee limits were set based on the Korean Financial 
Services Commission’s assessment of each eligible bank’s foreign debt maturing by June 30, 
2009.  
Only Hana Bank, one of Korea’s four largest banks, applied to participate in the program, 
issuing a total of $1.3 billion in guaranteed bonds in April and June of 2009. The State 
Guarantee program was terminated with the repayment of all commitments by Hana Bank 
on June 30, 2012.  
Summary Evaluation 
Given its limited utilization, few have evaluated the success of the guarantee program in 
isolation from other stabilization measures enacted at the time.  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To guarantee the foreign currency debt 
issued (including extensions of maturity) by 
domestic banks between the period of October 20, 
2008, and June 30, 2009, in order to relieve liquidity 
strains stemming from those banks’ difficulties in 
repaying their foreign currency loans.  
Announcement Date  October 19, 2008 
Operational Date October 20, 2008 
Date of First Guaranteed 
Loan Issuance 
April 6, 2009 
Issuance Window 
Expiration Date 
Originally June 30, 
2009; Extended to 
December 31, 2009 
Program Size $100 billion 
Usage  $1.3 billion by Hana 
Bank in total 
Outcomes No defaults 
Notable Features Limited to debt issued 
in foreign currencies to 
ensure continued access 
to external funding 
The State Guarantee of  
External Debt of Korean Banks 
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(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$1.2 trillion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$24,086 per capita in 2007 




rating (5-year senior 
debt) 
 


















$1.1 trillion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
94.2% in 2007 




Size of banking 




Banking system assets equal to 100% of 
financial system 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
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of banking system 
 
79.3% of total banking assets in 2007 
Data not available for 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database  
 
Foreign involvement 
in banking system 
12% of total banking assets in 2007 
13% of total banking assets in 2008 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
 
Data not available for 2007 
22.2% of bank assets owned by the state in 
2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $44,792 in 
mid-September 2008 
 
Source: Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and 








Having previously weathered the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Republic of Korea was 
considered to have been relatively more prepared than its Western counterparts to manage 
the economic fallout from the Global Financial Crisis (Rhee 2008). However, the country was 
not completely immune to the deleterious effects of the subprime downturn in 2007; Korea 
in particular suffered major losses in the first half of 2008 as overseas investors collectively 
withdrew $886 million and net foreign direct investment turned negative for the first time 
since 1980 (Fackler 2008). This divestment would later contribute to a deterioration in 
Korea’s ability to repay its external debts. Consequently, despite efforts by the government 
to emphasize the economy’s relatively stable domestic position, Korean markets remained 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Harden 2008).  
Confidence dropped precipitously over the summer of 2008 as the stock market plummeted 
38% and the Korean won fell 30% against the dollar (Harden 2008). In response, both banks 
and major corporations, such as Hyundai and Samsung, began hoarding domestic currency 
(Harden 2008, Sang-Hun 2008). To worsen matters, the September 15 Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy sent global credit markets into turmoil and fueled further anxieties over the 
strength of Korea’s export markets and foreign currency reserves (Fackler 2008). Domestic 
banks also began to bear the costs of the crisis more directly: Woori Bank, one of Korea’s 
largest lenders, found itself unable to borrow after the collapse. Overseas banks refused to 
roll over many existing loans and insisted that Woori pay in dollars as the debt came to 
maturity (Fackler 2008). Dollar loans from the government totaling $280 million kept the 
bank afloat.  
This lending crisis spread quickly throughout the Korean financial system as it became 
increasingly clear that domestic banks would not be able to honor their maturing foreign 
currency loans. Following news of Lehman’s insolvency, between 4Q2008 and 1Q2009, the 
banking sector suffered from rapid deleveraging as $42.8 billion in assets were taken out of 
the country (Kim 2009). Such a large selloff, coupled with the depreciation of the won and 
rising borrowing costs, caused Moody’s to declare Korea to be “one of the few banking 
systems in Asia where domestic deposits are insufficient to fund loans” (Eggertson and 
Krugman 2016, Sang-Hun 2008). Additionally, S&P downgraded the Big Four Korean banks 
—Kookmin Bank, Woori Bank, Shinhan Bank, and Hana Bank—from “stable” to “negative”on 
October 1. Their ability to raise foreign capital thus continued to decline (Gup 2010).  
Having relatively recently opened its markets to the international community, Korea did not 
have access to the same emergency sources of foreign currency reserves as did other 
countries (Fackler 2008). At the same time, it was more susceptible to market instability due 
to its transparency and openness to foreign capital (Fackler 2008). The Korean government 
attempted to calm markets by pointing to the soundness of the domestic real economy, 
particularly in terms of its low sovereign debt levels and steady economic growth of 4.5% 
over the previous five years (Rhee 2008). Still, it was decided on October 19, 2008, that the 
government should follow its international counterparts in instituting tangible stabilization 
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measures. As part of the program, the government began to offer guarantees on inter-bank 
loans to mitigate the ongoing liquidity crisis, “calm markets and preemptively minimize the 
total cost of employing the intervention” at a later date (Rhee 2008).                                      
Program Description 
The State Guarantee of External Debt of Korean Banks (henceforth, the “State Guarantee”) 
would be operational from its announcement date of October 20, 2008, through June 30, 
2009. The Operational Guidelines for National Guarantees of Foreign Debt Obligations of 
Domestic Banks (henceforth, “The Guidelines”), served as the memorandum of 
understanding between the government and the bank applying to issue debt under the 
guarantee program (2008). The “Proposed measures” document, a press release issued on 
October 19, 2008, by the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance, outlined the projected 
terms of the State Guarantee (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009).     
Under the authority of Article 92 of the National Finance Act, the Enforcement Decree of the 
National Finance Act, and The Rules for the Management of State Guarantees, the Korean 
government introduced a foreign debt guarantee scheme as part of a comprehensive set of 
stabilization measures intended to alleviate market liquidity pressures and ensure that its 
domestic banks maintained a competitive advantage in overseas funding (Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance 2008). Together with the Bank of Korea, the government would 
provide the banking sector with an additional $30 billion in dollar liquidity from foreign 
exchange reserves. Among other measures, it also provided tax incentives for the long-term 
holding of funds, invested Korean Won 1 trillion (ca. $760.5 million3) in the Industrial Bank 
of Korea, and took concrete steps to strengthen regional and international ties. 
Recapitalization of financial institutions and the expansion of deposit guarantees were 
deemed unnecessary at the time (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008). 
“We believe providing the government guarantee on banks’ foreign exchange dealings is the 
strongest step to save our foreign exchange reserves,” said Korean Finance Minister Kang 
Man-soo (Kim and Choonsik 2008).  
Any debt denominated in foreign currency issued (including extensions of maturity) by a 
domestic Korean bank or its overseas branches during this period and owed to a “non-
resident” institution (excluding foreign currency deposits and subordinated debt) would be 
eligible for a guarantee by the government for up to three years from the date of issuance or 
acquisition (The Guidelines). The government does not appear to have established minimum 
maturity requirements for eligible debt. On April 30, 2009, the guarantee was extended by 
the Ministry of Strategy and Finance to five years, although this allowance would prove to be 
unnecessary given the program’s limited utilization (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
2009a).  
The Korean government needed to secure the approval of the National Assembly to fund the 
guarantee structure. In the interim, either the Korean Development Bank or Korea Eximbank 
 
3 The October 20, 2008, exchange rate was 1 U.S. dollar = 1,315 Korean Won. 
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would provide guarantees. The Ministry of Strategy and Finance would then, after having 
received authorization, assume responsibility for all guarantees, including those previously 
offered by KDB or Korea Eximbank (“Proposed measures”). New debt would be guaranteed 
by the government only if explicitly requested and applied for (The Guidelines). The 
standardized guarantee (participation) fee, regardless of an individual bank’s credit rating, 
equaled 1% per annum of the daily outstanding balance of guaranteed debt on the basis of a 
360-day calendar year (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009a). However, the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance retained the right to set different guarantee fee rates “depending on 
market conditions, the financial condition of the Obligor, performance of covenants by an 
Obligor…and other relevant factors” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009a). On February 
16, 2009, the Korean government lowered the guarantee fee to 0.7% per annum (Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance 2009a). 
The government imposed a $100 billion cap on the total value of guarantees, as it was 
estimated that the external debt reaching maturity by the end of June 2009 would total $80 
billion (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008). There were also individual guarantee limits 
imposed on each bank. These were determined by the Financial Services Commission, which 
gathered information from the Financial Supervisory Services on the amount of each 
domestic bank’s foreign debt maturing by June 30, 2009, and added an extra 25% cushion 
(Jin-Woo 2008).  
The guarantee agreement would be triggered by an event in which the “Obligor fails to satisfy 
its payments on a date due as required under the Guaranteed Debt” (Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance 2009a). Coverage would include 100% of principal and interest, as well as default 
interest and related expenses, accrued “until the date of actual payment by the guarantor, up 
to the Guaranteed Amount” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009a). The government 
would also pay out in the event that the guaranteed debt were accelerated “as a result of the 
Obligor’s failure to comply with the covenants under the Guaranteed Debt” (Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance 2009a).  
Outcomes 
The Korean government issued only two bond guarantees to one of its eligible domestic 
banks over the course of the program’s duration. On April 6, 2009, Hana Bank issued $1 
billion worth of guaranteed bonds for a period of three years. Subsequently, it issued $280 
million for a period of either two and a half or three years. Hana Bank was ultimately able to 
meet all payments to foreign creditors without triggering the guarantee (Korea Institute of 
Finance 2009). All obligations, as specified by The Guidelines, were repaid to the lenders by 
June 30, 2012, at which point the program was terminated (Korea Institute of Finance 2009).  
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II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The State Guarantee was announced as part of a package of proposed stabilization 
measures released by the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance on October 19, 
2008.  
Together with the Bank of Korea, the government would provide the banking sector with an 
additional $30 billion in dollar liquidity from foreign exchange reserves. Among other 
measures, it also provided tax incentives for the long-term holding of funds, invested Korean 
Won 1 trillion in the Industrial Bank of Korea, and took concrete steps to strengthen regional 
and international ties. Recapitalization of financial institutions and the expansion of deposit 
guarantees were deemed unnecessary at the time 
2. The Korean government implemented the State Guarantee using its authority 
under Article 92 of the National Finance Act, the Enforcement Decree of the National 
Finance Act, and The Rules for the Management of State Guarantees. 
As discussed below, pending formal legal approval from the National Assembly, Korean 
authorities utilized the Korea Development Bank and Korea Eximbank to finance the State 
Guarantee.  
3. The State Guarantee would be financed by Korea Development Bank or Korea 
Eximbank until approved by the National Assembly. 
The Korea Development Bank and Korea Eximbank were charged with the responsibility of 
financing guarantees before the Ministry received formal approval from the National 
Assembly (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008). After gaining authorization, the Ministry 
would assume responsibility for all guarantees, including those previously offered by KDB 
or Eximbank (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008).   
4. Up to $100 billion in debt could be guaranteed under the program. 
It was estimated that the external debt reaching maturity by the end of June 2009 would total 
$80 billion (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008). 
5.  All domestic banks and foreign branches of those domestic banks were eligible for 
the State Guarantee.  
According to Article 2 “Definitions” of The Guidelines, the term “Domestic Bank” refers to 
any one of the following: (i) Kookmin Bank, Shinhan Bank, Woori Bank, Hana Bank, Korea 
Exchange Bank, Citibank Korea, Standard Chartered First Bank Korea, Pusan Bank, Daegu 
Bank, Kwang Ju Bank, Kyongnam Bank, Jeonbuk Bank, and Jeju Bank, each established under 
the Banking Act; (ii) the Korea Development Bank established under the Korea Development 
Bank Act; (iii) Industrial Bank of Korea established under the Industrial Bank of Korea Act; 
(iv) the Export-Import Bank of Korea established under the Export-Import Bank of Korea 
Act; (v) National Agricultural Cooperative Federation established under the Agricultural 
Cooperatives Act; and (vi) National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives established under 
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the Fisheries Cooperatives Act. “Domestic Bank” includes foreign branches of a Domestic 
Bank” (2008).  
6. Initially, eligible debt included any debt denominated in foreign currency issued 
(including extensions of maturity) by a domestic Korean bank or its overseas 
branches during this period and owed to a “non-resident” institution (excluding 
foreign currency deposits and subordinated debt). 
“Non-resident” as defined in Article 3, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 13 of the “Foreign 
Exchange Transaction Act” (2008), excludes branches of foreign banks located in Korea by 
definition since the Act defines them as “residents.” However, Article 2, Paragraph 2 of The 
Guidelines (October 31, 2008) included them as “non-residents” (Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance 2008)  
The “non-resident” definition part of Article 2, Paragraph 2 was deleted when the 
“Operational Guideline” was partially revised, as the purpose of the guarantee was thus 
changed from “State Guarantee of the Foreign Currency Debt of Domestic Banks owed to 
Non-Residents” to “State Guarantee of the Foreign Currency Debt.” This has the effect of 
extending eligibility to include foreign currency debt owed to “residents” as well as “non-
residents.” 
7. Initially, the State Guarantee would cover eligible debt for up to three years from 
the date of debt issuance or acquisition before this was later extended to five years.  
The three-year period was later extended to five years, but all obligations were met by June 
30, 2012. The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity 
requirements for eligible debt. 
8. All foreign currencies were eligible. 
Korean authorities limited eligibility to foreign currencies given their focus on ensuring 
institutions’ access to external funding. 
9. There were individual guarantee limits imposed on each bank based on the 
amount of such bank’s foreign debt maturing by June 30, 2009.  
These limits were determined by the Financial Services Commission, which gathered 
information from the Financial Supervisory Services on the amount of each domestic bank’s 
foreign debt maturing by June 30, 2009, and added an extra 25% cushion (Jin-Woo 2008). 
10. Participating banks were required to pay a standardized guarantee 
(participation) fee of 1% per annum of guaranteed debt, subject to increase. The 
guarantee fee was later reduced to 0.7% per annum on February 16, 2009. 
This standard fee, based off a 360-day calendar year, was imposed regardless of the 
individual bank’s credit rating. However, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance retained the 
right to set different guarantee fee rates “depending on market conditions, the financial 
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condition of the Obligor, performance of covenants by an Obligor [. . .] and other relevant 
factors” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009a).  
11. Participating banks were required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the Financial Supervisory Services and report to them on a daily basis the 
usage of the guaranteed fund.  
The MOU restricted the usage of the state-guaranteed funds to repayment of existing foreign 
currency debts.  
12.  The State Guarantee was designed to cover 100% of principal and accrued 
interest, including default interest and related expenses.  
The Korean government would fulfill its guarantee obligations if the “Obligor [failed] to 
satisfy its payments on the due date as required under the Guaranteed Debt” (Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance 2009a). The Korean government would also honor the guarantee 
payments in the case that the debt under contract was to be “accelerated as a result of the 
Obligor’s failure to comply with covenants under the Guaranteed Debt” (Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance 2009a).  
13. The issuance window was extended past its original date of June 30, 2009, to 
December 31, 2009.  
This extension occurred despite limited utilization of the State Guarantee. 
III. Evaluation 
This intervention was employed as a temporary measure meant to calm domestic markets 
and preempt any assumptions that Korean banks were not as stable or competitive as their 
international counterparts (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008). It was also intended to 
boost the won and relieve liquidity pressures stemming from maturing foreign loans by 
shoring up confidence in domestic banks’ ability to lend (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
2008). Managing Director of the IMF Dominique Strauss-Kahn initially hailed the 
intervention as one that would “bring Korea's policies closer in line with advanced countries, 
including some in the region, and help ease pressures in the local dollar funding market” 
(IMF 2008). Given the limited utilization of the guarantee program, few have evaluated its 
domestic impact or its role in the greater Global Financial Crisis.  
Dongchul Cho, Professor at the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, concluded that 
implementing the series of stabilization measures “must have helped mitigate concerns of 
international investors” (2010). Furthermore, by the end of 2009, several domestic banks 
were able to access international capital markets without having to resort to the government 
guarantee scheme (Shabsingh 2013). Implementation of the entire stabilization package 
immediately boosted the won as much as 22% against the dollar (Harden 2008).  
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Conversely, Shenai argued that the “proximate effects of this intervention were clear: despite 
the announcement, the won continued to depreciate, and the stock market continued its skid. 
South Korea was not able to autonomously stem capital outflows” (2009). This situation was 
not unique to the won or Korean equity markets; many other emerging-market economies 
suffered similar depreciations in their local currencies and capital outflows. Shenai contends 
that the subsequent dollar liquidity swap agreement with the U.S. Federal Reserve was 
mainly responsible for calming markets (2009). Similarly, Hyekyung Cho argues in a report 
for the North-South Institute that although these “emergency measures temporarily 
stabilized the won, [they] did not help stop the massive capital outflow” (Cho 2012). These 
appraisals most likely reflected the strength of Korea’s domestic economy more than the 
actual success of the guarantee part of the government aid package, itself. 
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